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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3288 
_____________ 
 
LUIS ALBERTO HERNANDEZ-CRUZ, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED  
STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the  
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-239-559) 
Immigration Judge:  Hon. Rosalind K. Malloy 
 
Argued: June 24, 2014 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, 
Circuit Judges. 
(Opinion Filed:  September 4, 2014) 
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Jamie Jasso, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Law Offices of Jaime Jasso 
The Westlake Office 
P.O. Box 3664 
Westlake Village, CA 91359-0664 
 
 Attorney for Petitioner 
 
Stuart F. Delery, Esq. 
Shelley R. Goad, Esq. 
Regina Byrd, Esq. 
Katharine E. Clark, Esq. [ARGUED] 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
 
 Attorneys for Respondent 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Luis Alberto Hernandez-Cruz petitions for review of 
his final order of removal. In his petition to this Court, 
Hernandez-Cruz argues that his Pennsylvania conviction for 
child endangerment does not constitute a crime involving 
moral turpitude (“CIMT”) because his statute of conviction 
“may be violated without implicating conduct that the Board . 
. . has defined as—inherently base, vile, or depraved.” 
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Petitioner’s Br. 10. We agree. Applying the categorical 
approach, we conclude that the least culpable conduct 
criminalized under Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute 
does not implicate moral turpitude. Therefore, we grant the 
petition for review and remand to the BIA for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 Hernandez-Cruz, a thirty-four year-old citizen of 
Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in 1998. 
Eleven years later, he pled guilty in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania to simple assault, in 
violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701(a)(1), and 
endangering the welfare of a child, in violation of 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4304(a)(1). The charges stemmed from an 
incident in which Hernandez-Cruz struck his stepson, who 
was ten years old at the time. 
 
 A few months after Hernandez-Cruz’s guilty plea, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice 
to Appear, charging that he was removable as an alien present 
in the United States without being admitted or paroled. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). DHS later filed additional charges, 
alleging that Hernandez-Cruz was removable as an alien 
convicted of a CIMT. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). These additional charges were based on 
his convictions for simple assault and child endangerment. 
Hernandez-Cruz conceded removability as an alien present in 
the United States without being admitted or paroled, but 
denied removability as an alien convicted of a CIMT. 
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 Hernandez-Cruz subsequently applied for cancellation 
of removal as a nonresident. During his removal proceedings, 
Hernandez-Cruz testified in support of his application for 
cancellation of removal and asserted that he believed his 
United States citizen children would experience exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship upon his removal.  
 
 The Immigration Judge concluded that Hernandez-
Cruz was removable as an alien present in the United States 
without being admitted or paroled. See INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i). 
The IJ also held that Hernandez-Cruz was removable as an 
alien convicted of a CIMT. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
With respect to the latter ground of removability, the IJ 
determined that Hernandez-Cruz’s Pennsylvania conviction 
for simple assault, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2701(a)(1), was not a CIMT because Pennsylvania’s simple 
assault statute “does not include an aggravating factor.” AR 
23. However, the IJ held that his conviction for child 
endangerment, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 4304(a)(1), constituted a CIMT because the statute requires 
“awareness by the accused that his violation of his duty of 
care, protection and support, is practically certain to result in 
the endangerment to his children’s welfare.” AR 24-25. 
 
 Having determined that Hernandez-Cruz was 
convicted of a CIMT, the IJ concluded that Hernandez-Cruz 
was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal and 
denied his application.
1
 The IJ noted, however, that 
                                              
1
 To qualify for cancellation of removal as a 
nonpermanent resident, an alien must demonstrate that: (A) 
he has maintained continuous physical presence in the United 
States for at least ten years before his application for 
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Hernandez-Cruz had successfully established that his removal 
would result in extreme and unusual hardship to his children, 
as is required for cancellation of removal. The IJ made clear 
that, had Hernandez-Cruz not been convicted of a CIMT, “the 
Court would find that [he] is statutorily eligible for the relief 
of cancellation of removal, and, as a matter of discretion, 
would grant [his] application.” AR 27. 
 
 Hernandez-Cruz appealed the decision to the BIA. In a 
written opinion, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling that 
Hernandez-Cruz’s Pennsylvania simple assault conviction 
was not a CIMT. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s 
determination that his Pennsylvania conviction for child 
endangerment qualified as a CIMT. The BIA agreed with the 
IJ that, because Hernandez-Cruz had been convicted of a 
                                                                                                     
cancellation; (B) he has been a person of good moral 
character during this same period; (C) he has not been 
convicted of particular criminal offenses; and (D) his 
“removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of 
the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.” INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) 
(eligibility requirements for nonpermanent residents). 
 As to the criminal offenses that bar cancellation of 
removal under INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), a nonpermanent 
resident applicant must show that he has not been 
convicted of an offense under INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2); INA § 237(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2); or INA § 
237(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3). The relevant provision in 
this case is INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), which renders inadmissible “any alien 
convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude.” 
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CIMT, he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of 
removal. Accordingly, the BIA dismissed Hernandez-Cruz’s 
appeal. Hernandez-Cruz timely filed a petition for review.
2
  
 
II.  Standard of Review 
 
 “Where, as here, the BIA issues a written decision on 
the merits, we review its decision and not the decision of the 
IJ.” Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 2014). 
This Court reviews the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo 
subject to the principles of deference set forth in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 844 (1984). See Bautista, 744 F.3d at 58. “Chevron 
teaches us to defer to the BIA’s determination that a certain 
crime involves moral turpitude when that determination is 
reasonable.” Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 276 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (citing Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 
2004)). However, we do not accord deference to the BIA’s 
interpretation of criminal statutes. See Knapik, 384 F.3d at 88. 
Rather, we review the agency’s interpretation of criminal 
statutes de novo. See id.  
 
III. Legal Background 
 
 The INA does not define the term “moral turpitude.” 
However, both the BIA and this Court have defined morally 
turpitudinous conduct as “conduct that is inherently base, 
vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality 
and the duties owed other persons, either individually or to 
society in general.” Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89. It is well-settled 
                                              
2
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of 
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
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that “the hallmark of moral turpitude is a reprehensible act 
committed with an appreciable level of consciousness or 
deliberation.” Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 414 (3d 
Cir. 2005). Additionally, it “is the nature of the act itself and 
not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a crime one 
of moral turpitude.” Totimeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 109, 114 
(3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 We apply the categorical approach to determine 
whether a conviction constitutes a CIMT. See Jean-Louis v. 
Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 465-66 (3d Cir. 2009). The 
categorical approach requires courts to “compare the elements 
of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction 
with the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as 
commonly understood.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). In assessing whether a conviction 
qualifies as a CIMT, we consider hypothetical conduct 
criminalized under the statute at issue. See Jean-Louis, 582 
F.3d at 471. Specifically, “we look to the elements of the 
statutory offense to ascertain the least culpable conduct 
hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under the 
statute.” Id. (citing Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411). The 
“possibility of conviction for non-turpitudinous conduct, 
however remote, is sufficient to avoid removal.” Id.  
 
IV. Analysis 
 
 The BIA unreasonably concluded that the least 
culpable conduct punishable under Pennsylvania’s child 
endangerment statute implicates moral turpitude. Under 
Pennsylvania law, “[a] parent, guardian or other person 
supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a 
person that employs or supervises such a person, commits an 
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offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by 
violating a duty of care, protection or support.” 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 4304(a)(1). To sustain a conviction under 
§ 4304(a)(1), a defendant must both knowingly endanger the 
child’s welfare and knowingly violate a duty of care. See 
Commonwealth v. Retkofsky, 860 A.2d 1098, 1099-1100 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2004); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 763 A.2d 895, 
900 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
 
 In its decision below, the BIA held that a conviction 
under § 4304(a)(1) constitutes a CIMT because the statute’s 
“‘knowingly’ scienter requirement is coupled with [an] 
aggravating factor,” namely “endangerment to a child with 
whom the defendant has a special relationship and duty to 
protect.” AR 4. The BIA reasoned that the fact “the offender 
had to know that the victim was a child whom he was charged 
to protect” means “the offense reflected the requisite degree 
of depravity and thus constitutes a CIMT.” Id. To the 
contrary, the combination of a knowing mens rea and the 
violation of a duty of care owed to a child, without anything 
more, does not necessarily implicate moral turpitude. 
 
 While § 4304(a)(1) requires a knowing mens rea, it 
criminalizes a broad swath of conduct because it “imposes a 
duty on parents and other caretakers to not risk any kind of 
harm, not just bodily injury, to a minor child in his or her 
care.” Commonwealth v. Coppedge, 984 A.2d 562, 563 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2009) (emphasis added). The statute “does not 
require the actual infliction of physical injury. Nor does it 
state a requirement that the child or children be in imminent 
threat of physical harm.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 817 
A.2d 485, 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). Moreover, 
Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute even prohibits 
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omissions to act. See Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 515 A.2d 
311, 315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“We conclude that a parent’s 
duty to protect his or her child requires affirmative 
performance to prevent harm and that failure to act may mean 
that the parent ‘knowingly endangers the welfare of the 
child.’” (quoting § 4304(a)(1)).  
 
 There are countless examples of non-turpitudinous 
conduct that could be criminalized under § 4304(a)(1). 
Hernandez-Cruz poses two examples of such conduct. In the 
first, an individual exceeds the speed limit by 5 mph while 
transporting a child passenger to whom he owes a duty of 
care. See Reply Br. 5. In the second, an individual slows 
down, but fails to stop completely at a stop sign, while 
transporting a child passenger to whom he owes a duty of 
care. See id. at 5-6. In both examples, if the individual acts 
with a knowing mens rea, the conduct is punishable under 
§ 4304(a)(1) because the individual has knowingly 
endangered a child’s welfare by violating a duty of care. 
However, neither example involves conduct that is 
“inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted 
rules of morality.” See Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89. Similarly, a 
father could knowingly endanger his son’s welfare and 
violate his duty of care by leaving his son alone in the car for 
five minutes. A mother also could knowingly endanger her 
10-year-old daughter’s welfare and violate her duty of care by 
leaving her daughter unattended in the swimming pool for ten 
minutes. Leaving a child alone in the car or unattended in the 
swimming pool for a few minutes might be poorly advised, 
but it is not “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Contra 
Totimeh, 666 F.3d at 116 (“Sexual assault, child abuse, and 
spousal abuse are no doubt inherently vile and elicit strong 
outrage.”). 
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 When making a CIMT determination, “proof of actual 
application of the statute of conviction to the conduct asserted 
is unnecessary.”Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471. Nevertheless, it 
is instructive to consider cases in which Pennsylvania courts 
have upheld convictions under § 4304(a)(1) in the absence of 
morally turpitudinous conduct. In Coppedge, for example, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court sustained a § 4304 conviction 
based on evidence that a mother scalded her three-year-old 
daughter in hot bath water, causing the girl to suffer second- 
and third-degree burns. 984 A.2d at 562. The court in 
Coppedge held that a parent’s failure to check the water 
temperature before placing her child in a bathtub is 
punishable under § 4304(a)(1), reasoning that “[i]t is 
impossible to place one’s own child in scalding hot bath 
water . . . without knowingly violating a duty of care by not 
checking the water before placing the child in the tub.” Id. at 
563. In another case, the Superior Court upheld a § 4304 
conviction based on evidence that the defendant allowed his 
children to live with filth and vermin in a dilapidated home 
with no working furnace for heat and with water running into 
the electrical box, thereby creating a fire hazard. See Wallace, 
817 A.2d at 492. In affirming the conviction, the court 
explained that the defendant’s “inaction clearly endangered 
his children’s welfare.” Id. Clearly, there is nothing 
“inherently base, vile, or depraved” about failing to check 
bath water before placing a child in a tub nor is there anything 
“inherently base, vile, or depraved” about exposing children 
to filthy living conditions. See Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89.  
 
 Because the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain 
a conviction under § 4304(a)(1) does not implicate moral 
turpitude, Hernandez-Cruz’s child endangerment conviction 
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does not qualify as a CIMT. The BIA went “beyond the 
bounds of reasonableness” in concluding otherwise. See 
Knapik, 384 F.3d at 90 (quoting Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 
573 (8th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, we grant Hernandez-Cruz’s 
petition for review and reverse the BIA’s CIMT 
determination. Our grant of the petition directly affects the 
BIA’s ruling with respect to Hernandez-Cruz’s eligibility for 
cancellation of removal, since the BIA held that he was 
statutorily ineligible for cancellation based on his conviction 
for a CIMT. Accordingly, we remand the case to the BIA for 
further proceedings because the Board still needs to address 
whether Hernandez-Cruz satisfies the other criteria required 
for cancellation of removal. See INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1) (eligibility requirements for nonpermanent 
residents).  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Pennsylvania’s child endangerment statute prohibits a 
broad range of conduct. Since the least culpable conduct 
punishable under § 4304(a)(1) is not morally turpitudinous, 
Hernandez-Cruz’s child endangerment conviction does not 
constitute a CIMT. Therefore, we grant the petition for review 
and remand for further proceedings. 
